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by
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Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
email: afield@scu.edu
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France, May 11, 2006, the All UC Conference in Riverside California, May 14, 2006, the 2006 Economic
History Association Annual Meetings in Pittsburgh, PA, September 17, 2006, and Stanford University,
October 18, 2006. Comments from Angus Maddison, Gerald Silverberg, Chris Hanes, and Paul David
were particularly helpful. Forthcoming in a special issue of the Journal of Macroeconomics.
ABSTRACT
In the immediate postwar period, Moses Abramovitz and Robert Solow both
examined data on output and input growth from the first half of the twentieth century and
reached similar conclusions. In the twentieth century, in contrast with the nineteenth, a
much smaller fraction of real output growth could be swept back to the growth of inputs
conventionally measured. The rise of the residual, they suggested, was an important
distinguishing feature of twentieth century growth. This paper identifies two difficulties
with this claim. First, TFP growth virtually disappeared in the U.S. between 1973 and
1995. Second, TFP growth was in fact quite robust between the end of the Civil War and
1906, as was in fact acknowledged by Abramovitz in his 1993 EHA Presidential address.
Developing a revised macroeconomic narrative is essential in reconciling our
interpretation of these numbers with what we know about scientific, technological, and
organizational change during the gilded age.

Introduction
In the immediate postwar period, Moses Abramovitz and Robert Solow both
examined data on output and input growth for the United States and reached striking and
similar conclusions. The pattern of disembodied technical change in the United States
appeared to be markedly different in the twentieth century as compared with the
nineteenth. In the twentieth century, a much smaller fraction of real output growth could
be swept back to the growth of inputs conventionally measured: the residual,
correspondingly, was much larger. Abramovitz published his findings in 1956, Solow in
1957, and their generalization rapidly became accepted as identifying a permanent
change in the sources of economic advance. At the end of his career, Abramovitz
continued to characterize the twentieth century as experiencing “Growth in the Era of
Knowledge Based Progress”, distinguishing it from the nineteenth (Abramovitz and
David, 2000). 1
Solow’s 1957 study examined data covering the four decades between 1909 and
1949; Abramovitz’s 1956 study examined growth up through an end period that averaged
data between 1944 and 1953. The big acceleration in TFP growth during the interwar
years (see below) surely colored their conclusions. Yet, as an examination of the U.S.
growth experience during the last part of the twentieth century makes clear, their
generalization about the nature of twentieth century growth was premature. After a lag
1

TFP advance is often equated with disembodied technological change, which should be understood
broadly. The residual captures growth in output not attributable to growth in inputs conventionally
measured. This may be the consequence of organizational innovation. It can also reflect shifts in the
economy from sectors with lower to those with higher productivity, as well as quality improvements in
inputs not otherwise accounted for. Some of these considerations imply that TFP growth may
overestimate the effect on output per hour of technological change narrowly defined, but it can also
underestimate it to the degree the latter raises the return to capital, inducing higher saving, or skews income
to households with higher income and higher propensities to save, in either case leading to rises in capital
labor ratios. Those who devote time to refining these estimates must, however, believe that they tell us
something of interest about the sources of economic growth. Abramovitz was famous for characterizing
TFP growth as a “measure of our ignorance,” but he also clearly felt that measures of the rate of advance of
the residual bore some relationship to the growth of (useful) knowledge.
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during the war period (1941-48), TFP growth persisted at high although somewhat more
modest rates during the golden age (1948-73). But it then ground to an almost complete
halt between 1973 and 1995. Output per hour continued to rise, albeit much more slowly,
but this was almost entirely attributable to physical capital deepening. Data are now
available for the entire century, and it is no longer possible to interpret the high rate of
TFP advance during the interwar years that prompted the Abramovitz/Solow
generalization as a defining characteristic of the century as a whole.
The collapse of TFP growth after 1973 is, however, only one aspect of the difficulty
with the Abramovitz/Solow claim. The other is that TFP growth in the last part of the
nineteenth century was in fact robust relative to long run historical trends, and indeed, far
stronger than it was in the last part of the twentieth. It looks modest only in comparison
with the exceptional performance in the second and third quarters of the twentieth
century, but that would be true of almost any other period held up for comparison. The
available data simply do not support the suggestion that almost all growth in the last third
of the nineteenth century can be swept back to inputs conventionally measured.
The principal statistical source for this investigation is Kendrick (1961).
Kendrick’s work has been the starting point for almost all modern research on U.S.
productivity growth prior to 1948. In the 1950s both Abramovitz and Solow worked with
his then unpublished data, Abramovitz and David (1973) used Kendrick for their post
1909 analysis, and recent papers, such as Gordon (2000), also begin with Kendrick. I
continue in that tradition although, in contrast to other papers (Field, 2003; 2006a,b; 2007
a,b,c,d), I focus here on data for the private domestic economy as well as the private
nonfarm economy, because of the important contribution of agriculture in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century.
2

What does it mean empirically to say that “almost all” growth can be swept back to
inputs conventionally measured? In an article coauthored with Paul David in 1973,
Abramovitz wrote that “…over the course of the nineteenth century the pace of increase
of the real gross domestic product was accounted for largely by that of the traditional,
conventionally defined factors of production…. The long term growth rate of total factor
productivity lay in a low range from .4 to .6 percent per annum” (Abramovitz and David,
1973, p. 429). They didn’t argue that technological change was unimportant in raising
output per hour but rather that its effects weren’t necessarily apparent in TFP growth.
Instead, they saw technical change as inducing a rise in the post Civil War saving rate by
increasing the return to investment, and thus influencing the growth in output per hour by
affecting the rate of capital deepening. Whatever the merits of this position, and whether
or not a rise in the saving rate was a response to higher returns, an aim of this paper is to
show that TFP growth was in fact quite robust from the 1870s through the first decade of
the twentieth century.
Abramovitz and David reported TFP growth of .5 percent per year between 1855
and 1905, with approximately .3 percent per year up through 1890, accelerating to .8
percent between 1890 and 1905 (Abramovitz and David, 1973, p. 430). The authors did
not present the numbers, in levels, that underlay their growth calculations, 2 which makes
it difficult to ask of the data questions others than those they posed. They promised that
“the full body of data (would) be presented for examination in a later publication”
(Abramovitz and David, 1973, p. 431), but this promise has been only partially met.
Some modifications in reported growth rates were, however, made in subsequent
publications. The main change appears to have been recalculation for the private
2

Output for example, was based on unpublished worksheets from Robert Gallman. See Rhode (2002).
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domestic economy, as opposed to a somewhat larger aggregate in the earlier work. They
reported TFP growth rates for the private domestic economy between 1855 and 1890 as
.36 percent per year (Abramovitz, 1993, p. 223) or .37 percent per year (Abramovitz and
David, 2000, p. 20).
A rate of TFP increase of .37 percent per year for 35 years is pretty low, and implies
a total rise in the level of TFP over the period of less than 14 percent. Can this rate of
growth be made consistent with the estimate of 1.22 percent per year between 1873.5 and
1892 derived from the Kendrick data (see Table 1 below)? That rate running from
1873.5 to 1890 would have raised the level of TFP by a total of more than 22 percent. So
for the Abramovitz and David numbers to be consistent with those reflected in Table 1,
derived from Kendrick, TFP would have had to have fallen between 1855 and 1873.5., at
a rate approaching -.4 percent per year.
Precisely that possibility is in fact acknowledged in Abramovitz’s presidential
address to the Economic History Association, where he breaks down the 1855-90 epoch
into two subperiods, reporting TFP growth for the PDE of -.4 percent per year between
1855 and 1871 and 1.00 percent per year between 1871 and 1890 (with .91 percent per
year between 1890 and 1905) (Abramovitz, 1993, p. 228). He acknowledges that these
subperiod calculations present potential problems for his interpretation:
Those who prefer to form their view from the shorter long swings would look
instead to the figures in Table 2. One might then tell a somewhat different tale.
One might then say that the years when the growth of capital intensity was the
dominant contribution to labor productivity growth were the mid century years,
from 1835 to 1871. One might argue that a transition toward a development
pattern resembling that of the present century began during the last quarter of the
last century. And one would be supported in this view by the facts that in those
years TFP became much larger…” (Abramovitz, 1993, pp. 227-28).
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This reference to a possible alternative to what has become the standard narrative is,
however, absent in Abramovitz and David (2000), where we are again given data only for
the very long periods 1855-1890 and 1890-1927. 3 The low reported TFP growth
between 1855 and 1890 obscures robust gilded age TFP advance because it combines the
influence of the years 1855-1871, in which TFP fell, with a post 1871 period in which it
rose.
As noted, the first part of this period, 1855 -1871, is one in which, according to
Abramovitz, TFP fell at -.4 percent per year, which means that the level of TFP was
about 6 percent lower in 1871 than it had been in 1855. Why might this have been? The
impact of the Civil War is a plausible explanation. War can push technological frontiers
forward in certain areas, but its overall impact is likely to be retardative. With over
600,000 fatalities in a population of roughly 31 million, with widespread physical
destruction in the South, and with the wrenching changes associated with the demise of
the peculiar institution, it is hardly surprising that the progress of innovation was set
back. War requires sharp but transient dislocations of an economy, and while it is true
that challenge or adversity can sometimes stimulate invention, war, on balance, does not
generally provide a fertile environment for scientific, technical, and organizational
progress (Field, 2000b; for an alternate view see Ruttan, 2006).
Understanding Abramovitz’s estimate of .37 for TFP growth in the PDE between
1855 and 1890 as resulting from the combination of -.4 percent per year from 1855
through 1871 followed by 1.00 percent per year from 1871 through 1890, numbers which
are similar to those in Table 1 below, we have the foundation, as Abramovitz recognized,
3

Editing by Cambridge University Press apparently eliminated the detailed appendix tables that would have
included the sub period calculations (personal communication from Paul David). My point, however, is as
much about narrative as it is about data. It remains true that the view into an alternate interpretation of the
19th century data, which one finds in Abramovitz (1993), is absent in Abramovitz and David (2000).
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for a rather different narrative. As Kendrick’s data show, and as Abramovitz
acknowledged in 1993, TFP growth following the Civil War was robust by absolute
standards. And as I will show, it was substantially higher than that experienced in a
comparable period of the twentieth century.
Before moving to that task, a quick look backward, prior to the Civil War. It’s clear
from the analysis of the subperiod data that the post-1871 TFP growth rates pose
difficulties for the Abramovitz-Solow narrative. This is less true for the 1835-1871 data,
as presented by Abramovitz. The growth rate over that 36 year period also reflects the
combined influence of two subperiods, the first between 1835 and 1855, in which growth
of output per hour was largely attributable to capital deepening, and the second, as noted,
in which TFP fell. Abramovitz has TFP essentially unchanged between 1835 and 1855,
dropping at -.01 percent per year over the period (1993, p. 228). Perhaps this was due to
the relatively modest rate of advance (compared to the post bellum period) in scientific,
technical, and organizational knowledge and practice.
Prior to Fort Sumter, the fundamentals of telegraphic and railroad technology were
established, and the country began to build nationwide networks for both. But only
30,000 miles of rail had been put in place on the eve of the Civil War, as opposed to a
quarter million miles of main track on the eve of the First World War, and the first
transcontinental telegraph line was completed only in 1861. The influence of modern
business enterprise was still modest. Railroads, the most important sector in which that
organizational innovation would be applied, still comprised a relatively small portion of
overall output. And until nationwide networks of railroad and telegraphic
communication were filled in, the technical preconditions for the spread of modern
business enterprise to distribution and some sectors of manufacturing were incomplete.
6

The Abramovitz/David calculations, relatively more conjectural for the earlier part of the
nineteenth century, show TFP roughly unchanged between 1835 and 1855 before
declining across the Civil War period.
Chart 1
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But the concern of this paper is with the postwar years, the period imprecisely
known as the gilded age – extending from the mid 1870s up through the business cycle
peak in 1906. And the basic data in Kendrick – and Abramovitz and David’s analysis of
subperiod data -- support a conclusion of robust TFP growth over these years. Kendrick
provides us with annual data starting in 1889, and prior to that, with estimates for 186978 and 1879-88. On chart 1 I have plotted the logged values of Kendrick’s TFP estimates
for the first two decadal averages and then annually through 1907, along with the logged
values of private domestic economy multifactor productivity (TFP) for 1973-2005 from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. The relative position of these groups of data is
not of interest here, because the index numbers in the two clusters of data use different
7

base years. What is relevant are the relative slopes evident in the two groups of data.
Visual inspection suggests a steeper slope, and thus faster rate of growth, in the earlier
period, an impression confirmed by running a time trend through each cluster.
Ideally, in comparing growth rates in different periods, we would like to measure
peak to peak, with each peak at or close to potential output, so as to control for the
procyclicality of TFP ( Field, 2007d). The NBER dates a strong business cycle peak in
May of 1907; Lebergott’s annual unemployment series, as well as Romer’s filtered series,
bottom out in 1906 (Lebergott, 1964; Romer, 1986). This is clearly the end of an
important expansion. Because the 1869-78 observation includes roughly two complete
peak to trough cycles according to the NBER chronology (June 1869 – December 1870
and October 1873 to March 1879), an estimate for the average over that period cannot be
interpreted as corresponding to a business cycle peak. A calculation from the initial
observation (treating it as corresponding to 1873.5, the midpoint of the interval) to 1906
shows compound annual growth of TFP of 1.44 percent per year. If TFP was procyclical,
however, this growth rate estimate will be biased upward, because the initial data point
cannot be treated as corresponding to a peak.
A better estimate is obtained by regressing the log of TFP from 1873.5 through
1907 on a time trend, which yields an estimate of annual TFP growth of 1.23. A
relatively straightforward peak to peak estimate runs from 1892 to 1906 (both troughs in
the annual unemployment estimates). This yields a rate of 1.24 percent per year for that
subperiod, at least 50 percent higher than the .8 percent suggested by Abramovitz and
David in their 1973 article for 1890-1905, 4 and substantially higher than rates registered

4

Abramovitz (1993) reported TFP growth of 1 percent per year between 1871 and 1890 and .91 percent per
year for the PDE between 1890 and 1905 (1993, p. 228).
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over a comparable period at the end of the twentieth century (.87 percent per year from
1973 through 2005). Abramovitz and David used five year averages centered on years
they considered peaks. The choice of beginning and endpoints matters in avoiding
cyclical confounds, and on this score 1892 and 1906 – both troughs in annual
unemployment series, are on this score more defensible than 1890 and 1905. 5
The rate of TFP growth implied for the period from after the Civil War to 1892 is
more than three times higher than what Abramovitz and David report for the entire period
1855-1890, although much closer to the 1 percent per year Abramovitz reported for 18711890 in his Presidential address. These data also suggest the absence of a major
discontinuity in TFP growth rates from the end of the Civil War to the 1906 business
cycle peak. 6 In contrast with the rapid growth prior to 1906, there follows afterwards a
substantial slowdown in TFP growth through 1919, prior to the TFP experience of the
1920s, which, as I have shown elsewhere (Field, 2006a), is almost entirely due to
advance in manufacturing.
TFP displays its fastest growth between 1929 and 1941. The calculated growth
rates over the periods 1929-1941 and 1941-1948 are based on a cyclically adjusted level

5

There are, as the text notes, a set of issues about whether 1892 and 1906 are to be preferred to 1890 and
1905 as business cycle peaks. Another set of issues involves the 5 year averaging method. This is sensible
if the most important problem is simply noise in the data. But it is more difficult to defend in the presence
of strong cyclical effects. Consider comparing a sharp business cycle peak, with steep drop offs on either
side, with a rounded one (close to potential output on either side). In such an environment, measuring
between 5 year averages centered on the peaks may give a less meaningful estimate of TFP advance than
simply measuring between peaks. The averaging method would, in the above instance, give a result which
is biased upward in the presence of procyclical TFP, because the initial period level would be brought
down by the lower TFP on either side of the peak more than would the end period level. These issues of
method and dating are, however, probably minor in terms of the larger argument of this paper. Whether
TFP growth averaged closer to 1 percent or closer to 1.2 percent a year over the gilded age is in some sense
beside the point, since both numbers reflect robust advance relative, for example, to growth at the end of
the twentieth century.
6
The identification of a peak can differ depending on the frequency of data examined. For monthly data,
one would say May 1907; for quarterly data , 1907:2, but for annual data, 1906, because this is the year for
which the estimates of the annual unemployment rate bottom out.
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for 1941, but this characterization holds even without the adjustment (see footnote a to
Table 1 and Field, 2007b).
Table 1
TFP Growth estimates, United States, Private Domestic Economy, 1869/78-2005
1869/78-1892a
1892-1906
1906-1919
1919-1929
1929-1941b
1941-1948b
1948-1973
1973-1989
1989-2000
2000-2005

1.23
1.24
.85
1.97
2.66
.84
2.13
.53
.93
1.83

a This estimate is based on a regression of logged values of TFP from 1869-78 though 1907 which yields
a trend growth rate of 1.23 percent per year. Since the first two observations are averages for ten year
periods, and assuming some procyclicality of TFP over this year, this is probably a slight overestimate,
since the initial period included almost two complete peak to trough cycles (see text). A straight calculation
for this period from the Kendrick data, centering 1869-78 on 1873.5, yields 1.59 percent per year, which
may partly reflect some procyclicality in TFP or remaining recovery from the Civil War. The 1892-1906
calculation is defensible as peak to peak, since both years represented troughs in the annual unemployment
series. The main conclusion is that TFP advance in the post Civil War decades prior to 1892 was not
dissimilar to that experienced between 1892 and 1906.
b
These growth rates are based on a cyclically adjusted TFP level for 1941. Unemployment in 1941 was
still 9.9 percent, and TFP was strongly procyclical over the years 1929-41 (as it has been for more than a
century – see Field 2000d), suggesting that its level would have been higher had the economy been closer
to full employment in the last year before full scale war mobilization. The adjustment is made, using data
from 1929 to 1941, by regressing the TFP growth rate from the previous year (difference in natural logs) on
the change in the unemployment rate (percentage points), and then using the coefficient on change in
unemployment to calculate what 1941 PDE TFP would have been had the economy been at potential
output, defined as the 3.8 percent unemployment experienced in 1948. The regression results are:
∆TFP =
.0270 - .0077* ∆UR
(-4.41)
R2 = .660 (3.53)
(t statistics in parentheses; data are for 1929-41; n = 12)
There is a 6.1 percentage point difference between actual 1941 unemployment (9.9 percent) and
unemployment at potential output (the 3.8 percent of 1948); implying that 1941 TFP would have been 4.7
percent higher than in fact it was had the economy been fully employed. The unadjusted growth rates,
calculated directly from Table A-XXII of Kendrick, are 2.27 percent per year for 1929-1941, and 1.51
percent per year for 1941-1948. For application of this methodology to data on the private nonfarm
economy, see below and additional discussion in Field (2007b).
Source: 1869/78 - 1948: Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII. 1948-2000. www.bls.gov, accessed January 26,
2006; 2000-2005, www.bls.gov, accessed October 18, 2006.
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From 1948 onward, data are from the BLS website. The logged values of TFP
(MFP) levels from the BLS website from 1973 through 2005 are also plotted on chart 1.
Peak to peak calculations for 1973-89 yield .53 percent per years, increasing to .93
percent per year from 1989 to 2000 and to 1.83 percent per year between 2000 and 2005.
For the entire 1973-2005 period, the compound annual growth rate is .87 percent per
year.
These data show that TFP growth rates in the last part of the nineteenth century
were far stronger than the narrative we have come to accept suggests, and substantially
higher than they were during corresponding years in the twentieth century. This
comparison and reframing is important, because it offers the possibility of reconciling
what has become a troubling disconnect in the teaching of U.S. economic history. How
could it be that the build out of the transcontinental railway and telegraph networks and
the development of modern business enterprise (Chandler 1977, Field, 1987), which both
enabled and was in turn enabled by these new technologies, had so little imprint on the
TFP data? How could it have been that the new technologies of the second industrial
revolution, such as Bessemer and Siemens-Martin open hearth steel, the Bonsack
cigarette making machine, or the disassembly line pioneered by Swift in meat packing,
left so little trace on the data? Add to this David and Wright’s argument that advance in
mineral extraction was heavily dependent on a knowledge base developed and
transmitted in universities, schools of mines, and professional associations (David and
Wright, 1997), as well as the dependence of the growth of American agricultural output
on biological innovation resulting from government sponsored R and D (Olmstead and
Rhode, 2002), and there is a real puzzle.
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Table 2
TFP Growth estimates, United States, Private Nonfarm Economy, 1869/78-2004
1869/78-1892a
1892-1906
1906-1919
1919-1929
1929-1941b
1941-1948b
1948-1973
1973-1989
1989-2000
2000-2004

1.95
1.11
1.12
2.02
2.78
.49
1.90
.34
.78
1.85

a This estimate is based on a regression of logged values of PNE TFP from 1869-78 though 1907 which
yields a trend growth rate of 1.59 percent per year. One needs 1.95 percent per year TFP growth from
1873.5 to 1892 to make the trend growth rate through 1907 consistent with the peak to peak calculation for
1892-1906.
b
These growth rates are based on a cyclically adjusted TFP level for 1941 (see note b to Table 1). The
adjustment is made, using data from 1929 to 1941, by regressing the PNE TFP growth rate from the
previous year (difference in natural logs) on the change in the unemployment rate (percentage points), and
then using the coefficient on change in unemployment to calculate what 1941 PNE TFP would have been
had the economy been at potential output, defined as the 3.8 percent unemployment experienced in 1948.
The regression results are:
∆TFP =
R2 = .647

.0283 - .0092* ∆UR
(3.02)
(-4.28)

(t statistics in parentheses; data are for 1929-41; n = 12)
The unadjusted growth rates, calculated directly from Table A-XXIII of Kendrick, are 2.31 percent per year
for 1929-1941, and 1.29 percent per year for 1941-1948. For additional discussion, see Field (2007b).
Source: 1869/78 - 1948: Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXIII. 1948-2000. www.bls.gov, accessed January
26, 2006, 2000-2004, accessed October 18, 2006.

How can one reconcile the influence of all these factors with the suggestion that
TFP growth averaged just .5 percent a year from the end of the Civil War into the first
decade of the twentieth century? This number obscures the relatively high post 1871 TFP
growth rates by combining them with the period of falling TFP between 1855 and 1871.
The commonly quoted generalization that TFP grew at about half a percent a year in the
post Civil War nineteenth century is inconsistent with the post 1871 data and with what
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we know qualitatively and at the sectoral level about the evolution of the economy after
the war.
Consider first the railroads and Fogel’s 1964 study of their social saving. Fogel
concluded that had saving flows been congealed in somewhat inferior capital investments
(canals, river dredging), U.S. GDP would have been about 4 percent lower in 1890 than it
was. Now, 4 percent is not a large number, but neither is it 0, and it can be translated into
an increment to TFP growth. Over a 25 year period (1865 to 1890), a .15 percent per
year increment to TFP growth, continuously compounded, yields a 4 percent boost to
GNP in 1890. Suggesting that total TFP growth up through 1890 was in the range of .37
percent per year, as did Abramovitz and David, leaves only .22 percent per year for
everything else. We should not, however, feel obliged to construct our narrative within
such a tight TFP budget.
Consider next that the build out of the railway network combined with the
construction of a transcontinental telegraph network gave rise to perhaps the greatest
organizational innovation of the last two centuries: what Chandler (1977) called modern
business enterprise. Is there any type of innovation that would be more likely to show up
in the residual, a measure of disembodied change, than this? The new organizational form
was critical for the operation of large railway and telegraph corporations. These
technologies were also what allowed MBE to be extended from transport and
communications to distribution and ultimately manufacturing (Field, 1987). The .15
percent per year does not account for the spillover effects of the railroad in using sectors,
most particularly its enabling of MBE. It will therefore underestimate the railroad’s
overall contribution to TFP.

13

If we accept the traditional narrative, MBE had apparently little measurable impact
on TFP growth prior to the First World War. When is it supposed to have had an impact?
Data from Table 1 for the PDE show TFP growth falling off after 1906. Data from Table
2 (see below) for the private nonfarm economy show some deceleration in TFP
comparing 1892-1906 with 1869-92, and Kendrick’s incomplete data for manufacturing
(see Table 3) show some retardation in that sector as one goes into the first years of the
twentieth century. By the time we get to the extraordinary TFP growth in manufacturing
of the 1920s (1919-1929), MBE is already well established, and the explanatory focus is
less on organizational innovation. Rather it has been on the delayed effects of
electrification, particularly the use of wires as a substitute for mechanical gears and shafts
in distributing power internally within the factory (Devine, 1973; David and Wright,
2003; Field, 2007c). The 1920s manufacturing revolution, moreover, was an across the
board phenomenon– evidenced in the uniformly high rates of TFP advance at the two
digit level (see Field, 2006a). The impact of MBE in manufacturing prior to the First
World War was far less uniform – quite important in a few key sectors, not so important
elsewhere. The same was true for distribution – but not rail transportation, where one
had to have it. The data show higher TFP growth in the private nonfarm economy in the
period from the end of the Civil War up through 1892. This is the more relevant
aggregate if one is interested in the likely effects of MBE, and the data are consistent
with its having played a contributing role in robust TFP growth then. Again, this is
where Abramovitz’s 1993 pre World War I subperiod data shows the fastest TFP growth.
To what degree could the discrepancy between the low TFP rates associated with
the conventional narrative and those in Table 1 have to do with differential accounting for
the growth of land input? Kendrick does include land in his estimates of farm capital,
14

which are derived from Tostlebe (1957). If Kendrick’s numbers do not adequately
account for the growth of land input in agriculture, then TFP growth estimates for the
private domestic economy for the end of the nineteenth century might be too high. One
way to explore this possibility is to examine trends in TFP growth rates for the private
nonfarm economy, for which the growth of land inputs is presumably less directly
relevant.
To estimate TFP growth rates for the private nonfarm economy from the end of the
Civil War up to 1892 I employ a methodology similar to that used for the private
domestic economy. First, run a time trend through the logged values of Kendrick’s PNE
data, centering 1869-78 on 1873.5 and 1879-1888 on 1883.5. This yields 1.59 percent
per year, continuously compounded from 1873.5 through 1907. Second, do a relatively
clean peak to peak measure between 1892 and 1906, which yields 1.11 percent per year.
Third, ask what growth rate one would have needed between 1873.5 and 1892 to be
consistent with the results of the first calculation. The answer is 1.95 percent per year.
This suggests strong TFP growth in the private nonfarm economy before 1892,
moderating thereafter. Keep in mind that 1.11 percent per year between 1892 and 1906 is
still substantially higher than what was registered in the U.S. twentieth century economy
from 1973 onward. Whereas the Abramovitz and David narrative proposes accelerating
TFP after 1890 (.8 percent per year rather than .3 percent earlier), Table 2 suggest some
deceleration for the private nonfarm economy comparing the years before and after 1892.
Table 1 showed rough constancy for the private domestic economy; the differences have
to with some acceleration in TFP growth in agriculture comparing 1892-1906 with the
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earlier period. 7 Neither Table 1 nor Table 2 is consistent, however, with notable
acceleration after 1890. The Abramovitz and David suggestion of .3 percent up through
1890 and .8 percent from 1890 through 1905 is, again, potentially misleading, because
the .3 (or .37 percent) from 1855 through 1890 is a productivity growth estimate dragged
down by declining productivity across the Civil War period.
The data on sectoral productivity trends is less complete than that for the aggregate
measures, but what is available help us flesh out the underpinnings of what we are
picking up in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3 shows rates of TFP growth in mining, manufacturing, and telephone and
telegraphs. These data suggest that the biggest gains in manufacturing came in the 1880s,
after which growth slowed before the huge acceleration after 1919. In mining, the 1890s
appear to have been a particularly fertile period (see David and Wright, 1997), and we
also see an acceleration for agriculture. Progress in communication remains relatively
strong throughout.
Table 3
TFP Growth in Mining, Manufacturing, and Telephone and Telegraphs, 1869-1919
Mining
1869-79
1879-89
1889-99
1899-1909
1909-1919

Manufacturing
.86
1.94
1.12
.72
.28

1.24
2.49
.77
1.39

Tel. and Tel.
2.30
1.27
3.98
1.35

Source: Kendrick, 1961, Tables C-III, D-1, H-III.

The relatively strong gains in manufacturing during the 1880s likely reflect the
contribution of modern business enterprise. The 1880s were a big decade for the
expansion of such MBE intensive subsectors as steel, cigarettes, meatpacking, and
7

TFP in agriculture grew at a rate of 1.57 percent per year between 1892 and 1906 as compared with .56
percent per year between 1869 and 1892 (Kendrick, 1961, Table B-1).
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petroleum refining. Use of this organizational form required the availability of reliable
railroad and telegraph service, and was necessary in manufacturing to exploit economies
dependent not just upon scale per se but on ensuring high levels of capacity utilization
and rates of inventory turnover.
Finally, the growth of total factor productivity in railroads was very strong
throughout the post Civil War period – higher than the rate of growth in the economywide aggregates and thus a significant contributor to them. Much of this represented the
consequence of a continuing process of technical change resulting in larger locomotives
and rolling stock, air brakes, and automatic couplers (Fishlow, 1966). But much,
including the economically successful exploitation of such improvements, reflected and
depended upon the contribution of modern business enterprise – the organizational form
that allowed the operation of private enterprises whose size and dominance in the
economy had never been witnessed before and has never been seen since. MBE was an
absolute requirement in the business of railroad transportation, especially on a largely
single tracked system, whereas MBE was adopted only in portions of the distribution and
manufacturing sectors (Field 1992). The high penetration within the railroad sector was
unmatched elsewhere, with the possible exception of telephone and telegraphs, which
also exhibited TFP growth above that registered in the economy wide aggregates (see
Table 3).
Table 4 also includes data on the growth rates of labor and capital productivity
(TFP growth rates are a weighted average of the two). Readers may be surprised by the
relative rates of increase of labor and capital productivity as well the respective sectoral
increases in capital and manhours associated with them. Although the capital output ratio
for the economy rose (in other words, capital productivity went down), in part as the
17

consequence of the enormous accumulation in railroads, the situation within the sector
itself was quite different. The sector of the economy most thoroughly penetrated by
MBE generated rates of increase of capital productivity averaging over 5 percent per year
from 1873.5 through 1906. Aside from assuring that trains didn’t collide, an event which
is, one might say, capital using, advanced logistical control contributed to rises in capital
productivity by enabling higher utilization rates on fixed capital and rolling stock. One
can interpret this simply as a scale economy, but the ability of a system to generate low
costs at high volume is beside the point if volume cannot be managed and sustained at
those levels. This required increases in labor input even more rapid than those of capital.
Table 4
Productivity Growth in Railroads, 1873.5-1919

1873.5-1883.5
1883.5-1892
1892-1906
1906-1919

TFP

Output/hour

4.25
2.33
2.56
3.02

3.58
1.86
1.82
3.33

Output/unit
of capital
5.75
4.98
5.31
1.70

Source: Kendrick, 1961, Table G-III.

Whereas capital in railroads grew at 1.96 percent per year between 1873.5 and
1906, manhours rose at 4.92 percent per year (Kendrick, 1961, Table G-III, p. 543). 8 In
other words, in railroad enterprises, capital shallowed at a rate of about 3 percent a year,
one of the reasons capital productivity went up so much. In contrast, for the private
domestic economy as a whole, capital grew at 3.76 percent per year and manhours at 2.75
percent per year between 1873.5 and 1906, so capital was deepening at a rate of about 1

8

Fishlow (1966) is critical of Ulmer’s data which underlie Kendrick’s railroad capital stock indices. But
even Fishlow’s data indicate capital shallowing in railroads, although not to the same degree. Between
1870 and 1910, he has persons engaged growing at 5 percent per year, while capital grew at 4.5 percent per
year. Fishlow, 1966, Table 10, p. 626.
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percent per year (Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII). 9 The trends within the railroad sector
are testimony to the degree to which modern business enterprise is a capital saving
innovation. MBE uses labor and saves capital (Field, 1987), and this characteristic is
especially evident in sectors where the organizational form had its deepest penetration.
The need to insure high volume flows is central to Chandler’s emphasis on the
importance of throughput, whether he is discussing transportation, communication,
distribution, or manufacturing. Modern business enterprise, in the context of the new
railroad and telegraph technologies, represented a decisive break with prior modes of
business practice. There were no modern business enterprises in 1840. In The Visible
Hand (1977) Chandler suggests that if a contemporary business manager were
transported back to 1910 he would be pretty much at home in the organizational and
management environment, but if he were transported back to 1840, he would be in a
different world, and might as well go back to the fifteenth century.
Modern business enterprises employ a multidivisional structure, depend on
management information systems, and are run by a cadre of professional managers.
Nineteenth century MBEs used the telegraph to move information quickly, the typewriter
to create and maintain administrative office records, and the vertical file to store them.
The linotype machine and innovations in making cheap paper from wood pulp spelled
dramatic reductions in the cost of mass media, which were in turn increasingly utilized by
department stores, mail order houses, and manufacturers to stimulate demand for their
products or services through advertising.

9

For the private nonfarm economy, capital grew at 4.99 percent per year, manhours at 3.46 percent
between 1873.5 and 1906, so capital deepened at more than 1.5 percent per year (Kendrick, 1961, Table AXXIII.
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MBE developed first in the railroads. The telegraph industry also faced an
imperative to manage high speed traffic, and employed MBE as well. The organizational
form then spread to wholesale and retail distribution, giving rise to such new institutions
as the department store and the mail order house. Finally, it was adopted in a limited
number of subsectors of the industrial sector – in such businesses as steel, cigarette
manufacturing, petroleum refining, meatpacking, and sewing machines/typewriters.
MBE made possible and in turn was technologically dependent on nationwide systems of
telegraph communication and railroad transportation. You could not have MBE without
the telegraph, and there was no rationale for it without the railroad.
The hypothesis that the diffusion of MBE is implicated in TFP increases is not
simply speculative: it leads to testable predictions. The historical narrative is reasonably
clear with respect to where the organizational form did and did not take root prior to
World War I: almost 100 percent in railroads and telegraphs, in parts of distribution
(department stores, mail order houses) and in part but by no means all of the
manufacturing sector (steelmaking, cigarette manufacture, meatpacking, petroleum
refining, sewing machines/typewriter/firearm assembly) (Chandler, 1977; Field, 1987).
The hypothesis predicts that in sectors wholly or partially penetrated by MBE, one should
see TFP growth stronger than in the economy as a whole. The data in Tables 3 and 4 are
largely consistent with this hypothesis. TFP growth in railroads and telegraphs was above
the economy wide average throughout the period in question. In manufacturing this was
so in the 1880s and especially the 1890s. Data for the distribution sector are also
consistent with this view (see Field, 1996).
Chandler’s principal focus was on organizational innovation. In a somewhat
similar vein, Vaclav Smil has recently explored the contributions of late nineteenth
20

century scientific and technical advance to twentieth century growth. His main thesis,
which bears similarities with Chandler’s, is that the four decades prior to the first World
War contributed to a decisive break with the past:
…the fundamental means to realize nearly all of the 20th century accomplishments
were put in place before the century began, mostly during the three closing
decades of the 19th century and in the years preceding WW1. That period ranks
as history’s most remarkable discontinuity not only because of the extensive
sweep of its innovations but also because of the rapidity of fundamental advances
that were achieved during that time (Smil, 2005, pp. 5-6).
A good deal of what Smil goes on to describe represented larder stocking: the
establishment of foundations upon which was predicated future progress. But much of
the advance had an immediate impact: “Many pre WW1 innovations were patented,
commercialized and ready to be diffused in a matter of months (telephone, lightbulbs) or
a few years (gasoline powered cars, synthesis of ammonia) after their conceptualization
or experimental demonstration” (Smil, 2005, p. 9). Thus TFP growth between the Civil
and First World Wars can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of contemporaneous
scientific and technical progress combined and sometimes interacting with the effect of
evolutionary improvement of systems such as the railroad and the telegraph whose
foundations had been established prior to the Civil War. Rapidly commercialized
breakthroughs and progress building upon earlier foundations meant that scientific,
technical, and organization advance during this period had an impact on the way people
lived then, as well as on how they would live after the First World War
In language similar to Chandler’s, Smil writes that: “The enormity of the post
1860 saltation was such that people alive in 1913 were further away from the world of
their great-grandparents who lived in 1813 than those were from their ancestors in 1513”.
He makes a similar point about scientific progress, arguing that if one transported the
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distinguished French chemist Lavoisier forward to the early twentieth century, much of
what he would have seen would have been incomprehensible to him. In contrast,
transport Edison, Fessenden, Haber, or Parsons (developer of the turbogenerator) to the
early twenty first century and they’d be on top of what they were seeing – indeed, they
would have provided the scientific and technical foundations for much of it (Smil, 2005,
pp. 28, 296).
TFP advance in any given period results from the exploitation of technical systems
whose foundations have been laid earlier and from the rapid commercialization of new
products and processes resulting from contemporaneous scientific and technical progress.
Some of that progress will, however, not be immediately exploited, thus replenishing the
cupboard for subsequent periods. One needs to acknowledge the importance of larder
stocking without suggesting that scientific and technical progress had little influence on
living standards or productivity growth rates prior to the First World War. 10
Clearly, the mix of larder stocking and immediate impact varied across the different
areas of advancement examined by Smil. For example, his exposition gives pride of
place to electricity, and we can consider its impact in providing motive power in
manufacturing. A small steam engine, he argued, could convert only about 4 percent of
coal’s energy into power, of which 60 percent was lost in the process of mechanical
transmission to the work station via overhead shafts and belts. The transmission system,
moreover, had to be shut down typically for about 10 percent of the time for

10

Again, to be fair to Abramovitz and David, they never made this argument in precisely these terms. But
they did argue that virtually all of the influence of technological advance on output per hour worked
through a rate of profit/ interest rate mechanism, encouraging higher saving flows and faster rates of
physical capital deepening. A corollary was that little of the influence of technological advance was
evident in TFP growth.
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maintenance. So we are dealing with energy efficiency of about 1.4 percent (.04*.4*.9)
for steam generated power distributed mechanically within a factory.
In contrast, by the time of the First World War, electricity produced with a
turbogenerator had an energy conversion efficiency of about 10 percent. Assuming 10
percent of this was lost in transmission, and the use of a direct drive electric motor with
85 percent efficiency, we have overall energy efficiency of almost 8 percent (.1*.9*.85) –
a five fold improvement. Removing the straightjacket of mechanical distribution of
power also allowed substantial savings on floor space and the possibility of moving to
single story rather than multiple story installations.
The conventional narrative argues, however, probably correctly, that most of the
gains from this source were not realized until the 1920s, and indeed underlay the fabulous
– more than 5 percent per year – growth of TFP in the manufacturing sector between
1919 and 1929 (see Kendrick, 1961; Devine, 1983; David and Wright, 2003; Field,
2007c). So whereas it would be fair to say that prewar advances in systems of power
generation laid the foundation for post World War I advance in manufacturing TFP, it is
unlikely that a great deal of the prewar TFP growth can be attributed to the electrification
of industry, at least with respect to motive power. Note that within manufacturing, the
Kendrick data suggest the fastest gains in the 1880s, certainly well before any of this
could have had much effect.
The situation is quite different, however, with respect to space lighting and traction.
By 1900 there were over 1,000 central power stations in the U.S. Much of the demand
these stations satisfied was residential, but some was also in commerce and
manufacturing, particularly in industries such as textiles where electric lighting offered
much lower probabilities of inducing explosions than did gas and facilitated expanded
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shift work. By absolute standards incandescent bulbs were and still are quite inefficient
in turning energy into light, but in comparison to candles or gas, they represented a big
improvement. Smil estimated that candles converted .01 percent of paraffin’s chemical
energy into light, and coal gas no more than .05 percent. By 1913 tungsten filaments
converted 2 percent of electric energy into light. With 10 percent generation efficiency
and 10 percent transmission losses, energy efficiency had risen to .18 percent (.1*.9*.02),
still very low but more than three times that of coal gas. The efficiency of converting
coal into electric power benefited from very rapid gains in the electricity generating
sector, involving the switch from the use of steam engines to drive dynamos to the use of
steam turbines linked inline with a generator or alternator. As the result of improvements
in bulbs, and power generation, as well as reductions in loss due to transmission, the cost
of household lighting fell 90 percent in just two decades between 1892 and 1912. Steam
engines themselves underwent substantial improvements, with energy efficiency for new
large stationary installations rising from 6 - 10 percent in the 1860s to 12-15 percent after
1900 (Smil, 2005, pp. 289-90).
If direct drive motors were slow to find their way into manufacturing, that was not
true in traction. Edison’s Pearl Street station opened in 1882. By 1893 14 out of 16 cities
with population greater than 200,000 had electric traction streetcars as did 41 of 42 cities
with population between 50,000 and 200,000 (Dyer and Martin, 1929, cited in Smil,
2005, p. 94).
A second area upon which Smil focused is materials. David Landes (1969, p. 259)
noted that the real cost of steel fell 80- 90 percent between the early 1860s and the mid1890s. Crude oil in the United States in 1910 cost 10 percent of what it had in real terms
in the 1860s. With the invention of the Hall-Herout reduction process, the real cost of
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aluminum fell 90 percent between 1890 and 1913, although the use of this advanced
material in the economy was still very small. (Smil, 2005, pp. 155, 292). These cost
reductions are the duals of productivity advance in the respective sectors, and they are the
consequence of more simply than the effects of capital deepening.
All of the foundational work on the gasoline powered internal combustion engine
was done prior to the First World War. Although this was largely larder stocking, with
most of the big productivity gains in the use of self propelled vehicles yet to come, some
gains were already beginning to be reaped prior to the war. In 1913 the operating cost of
a truck was 40 percent that of a horse drawn vehicle, garaging costs alone were barely 15
percent of the analogous space requirements for a horse (Perry, 1913, cited in Smil, 2005,
p. 288). The same economics can be applied to the use of electric power for purposes of
traction. Ultimately, the replacement of horsepower with the gasoline engine would free
a substantial portion of American crop acreage for purposes other than producing feed for
animals.
Similarly, although the scientific and technical foundations for radio and moving
pictures were established prior to the war, much of the realization of gains associated
with it took place subsequently.
Smil argued that most of the important scientific and technical foundations for
twentieth century economic growth were established in the two generations prior to
WWI. We can acknowledge that much of the impact on aggregate productivity was not
felt until later in the twentieth century, particularly the interwar years (Field, 2006a,b,
2007a), and also recognize that much, such as Bessemer and Siemens-Martin steel, did
have an immediate impact. We can also acknowledge that much productivity growth and
living standard improvement in the years from 1871 through 1906 was influenced by
25

spillovers from the build out of the railroad and telegraph networks, technologies whose
foundations were laid pre Civil War, as well as rapid productivity growth within those
sectors themselves.
Spillovers took the form of innovations in business organization that allowed new
ways of doing business in using sectors. Some examples: the telegraph enabled the
development of a system of stock trading after the Civil War that persisted in essentially
unaltered form for almost a century – breaking down only in 1968 (Field 1998). The
telegraph and the railroad were essential technical preconditions for the revolution in
meat packing and distribution engineered by Swift and Co. and its competitors.
Carnegie’s steel making revolution depended on the railroad and telegraph for its
logistical operation (and railroads played an important role in stimulating the demand for
his product). The development of the American Tobacco Company and exploitation of
the Bonsack cigarette making machine is inconceivable without the railroad and the
telegraph, as is Rockefeller’s success with Standard Oil. In all these cases: stock trading,
beef and pork packing, steel, cigarettes, and petroleum products, we see very substantial
declines in real prices.
In the two generations prior to the First World War scientific advance became
increasingly important as an underpinning of economic growth. For the first time in
history technical advance depended substantially on an understanding of scientific
principles, including modern chemistry, which underlay the Haber-Bosch process for
synthesizing ammonia, the laws of thermodynamics, which were critical in improvements
in the efficiency of steam engines, as well as the development of steam turbines, and
advances in understanding electromagnetism, which underlay breakthroughs in wireless
communication as well as the development of improved electric motors. If modern
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business enterprise was the most important institutional innovation in this period, a good
candidate for the second would be the industrial research laboratory, which played a role
in all of the above developments. As Abramovitz acknowledged, once one looks at the
subperiod calculations, there is no longer a disconnect between narratives such as Smil’s
and the aggregate data. Strong TFP advance after 1871 is consistent with the importance
of “Knowledge Based Progress” in the last part of the nineteenth century, as it is with the
major acceleration in per capita patenting rates in the United States after the Civil War
(Khan and Sokoloff, 2001, p. 239).
Together, this qualitative and quantitative evidence makes implausible the
suggestion that economic growth in the gilded age can almost entirely be explained as the
consequence of the growth of inputs conventionally measured, or that labor productivity
and living standard advance is virtually entirely to be attributed to capital deepening. The
macro numbers don’t show this, and such a conclusion is contrary to the impression of
contemporary observes such as Byrn (1901) that they were living and had lived through
an historically unique transition, a conclusion affirmed in the judgments of more recent
writers such as Chandler and Smil.
Conclusion
Productivity advance in any period is the consequence of the exploitation of
technical foundations which have been established earlier and breakthroughs that are
rapidly commercialized and have their impact within the same epoch. The period 18711913 is no different in this regard. The technical foundations for the railroad and the
telegraph were pre Civil War, although the proximately significant advances that allowed
for the plummeting prices of steel and aluminum took place after the war. The rapid
progress in scientific, technical and organizational knowledge during the two generations
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prior to the First World War laid the foundations for twentieth century advance,
particularly that remarkable period between the two world wars. But it also underlay the
qualitative and quantitative changes that characterized the epoch – the multifaceted
improvements that in the minds of so many observers irrevocably separated the world of
1910 from that a half century earlier.
Perhaps Edward Byrn can be forgiven some millennial enthusiasm when he wrote
in 1901 about the century just completed:
The Philosophical mind is ever accustomed to regard all stages of growth as
proceeding by slow and uniform processes of evolution, but in the field of
invention the nineteenth century has been unique. It has been something more
than a merely normal growth or natural development. It has been a gigantic tidal
wave of human ingenuity and resource, so stupendous in its magnitude, so
complex in its diversity, so profound in its thought, so fruitful in its wealth, so
beneficent in its results, that the mind is strained and embarrassed in its effort to
expand to a full appreciation of it. Indeed the period seems a grand climax of
discovery, rather than an increment of growth (Byrn, 1901, p. 3).
Edward Bellamy, H.G. Wels, and Jules Verne would have agreed. Macroeconomic
data are consistent with this interpretation. They do not support the view that the last part
of the nineteenth century exhibited exceptionally low rates of increase in total factor
productivity. TFP growth averaged, for the private domestic economy, above 1.2 percent
per year from the early 1870s up through 1906. Such growth was substantially more
robust than that experienced in the last part of the twentieth century. Revision in our
macroeconomic narrative for the years between the Civil and First World Wars is
necessary to reconcile it with these numbers and with what we know about
organizational, scientific, and technological progress at the sectoral level during the same
period.
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